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1 Introduction
In October 2012 the Nobel prize was attributed to Al Roth and Lloyd Shap-
ley for their work on matching. Both the seminal Gale-Shapley (1962) paper
and most of Roth’s work were concerned with allocation mechanisms when
prices or other transfers cannot be used—what we will call non-transferable
utility (NTU) in this survey. Gale and Shapley used college admissions,
marriage, and roommate assignments as examples; and Roth’s fundamental
work in market design has led to major improvements in the National Resi-
dent Matching Program (Roth and Peranson 1999) and to the creation of a
mechanism for kidney exchange (Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver 2004.)
While these are important economic applications, matching problems are
much more pervasive. Market and non-market mechanisms such as auctions
match agents with goods, and buyers with sellers; agents match to each
other in production teams, and production tasks are matched with workers;
and in trade theory, countries are matched with goods or varieties. Yet while
the basic theory of matching was in place forty years ago, only recently has
there been an explosion of empirical work in this area. Several developments
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have concurred to bring it to the attention of applied researchers.
On the theoretical front, the path-breaking contributions of Koopmans-
Beckmann (1957), Gale-Shapley (1962), Shapley-Shubik (1972), Becker (1973,
1974) and Kelso-Crawford (1982) were followed by extensive investigations
in the 1980s; these culminated in the classic monograph by Roth and So-
tomayor (1992). Important contributions renewed interest in matching mod-
els more recently. Hatfield-Milgrom (2005) exploited the analogy of match-
ing with contract theory, auctions and general equilibrium. Their paper
encompassed NTU and TU matching in a general framework, and it also
opened the way to new results on many-to-one and many-to-many matching.
Several authors explored models of matching with frictions (e.g. Shimer-
Smith 2000 and Eeckhout-Kircher 2010), with the aim of enriching equi-
librium models of unemployment in particular. One-to-one matching mod-
els have been revisited to take into account imperfectly transferable utility
(Chiappori-Reny 2007, Legros-Newman 2007.) Finally, another strand of
the theoretical literature on TU models has built on advances in the mathe-
matical theory of optimal transportation, whose application to several fields
of economic theory has proved quite successful1; we will give an example
later in this survey.
The resulting insights have been applied to a host of issues, including
the allocation of students to schools, the marriage market with unbalanced
gender distributions, the role of marital prospects in human capital invest-
ment decisions, the social impact of improved birth control technologies and
many others. Finally, and perhaps even more interestingly, the economet-
rics of matching models have recently been reconsidered, from different and
equally innovative perspectives. The goal of the present project will be to
survey these methodological advances. We shall describe the main difficul-
ties at stake, the various answers provided so far, and the issues that remain
open.
1The original optimal transportation model dates back to Gaspard Monge (1781); as
became apparent much later, optimal transportation and matching under transferable
utility are very tightly connected. See Ekeland 2010, Chiappori-McCann-Nesheim 2010
and other papers in that special issue of Economic Theory.
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1.1 TU and NTU
Any presentation of recent contributions in this booming area must be struc-
tured around a small number of basic distinctions. The first, and arguably
the most important, is between transferable (TU) and non transferable
(NTU) utility models. While recent theoretical advances have shown that
these two settings can be analyzed using similar tools (see Hatfield-Milgrom
(2005) and the subsequent literature), their areas of practical relevance are
largely disjoint. This crucial point is often misunderstood. In some situa-
tions (e.g., the allocation of students to public schools), transfers are simply
excluded, and a TU framework would make little sense. In many other ap-
plications (on the job market, and also within the household), explicit or
implicit transfers are paramount and can hardly be ignored.
This would not matter if these two classes of models had similar testable
predictions; but the “market clearing” mechanisms are different in the two
contexts (with transfers playing the role of market clearing prices in TU
models), leading to significantly different comparative statics. For instance,
take Becker’s famous result that with one-dimensional characteristics, posi-
tive complementarities in joint surplus imply positive assortative matching
(PAM). Becker also showed in that paper (Becker 1973, pp. 835-6) that
without transfers, the condition for PAM is that preferences on each side
be increasing in types. Neither condition implies the other. Smith (2011)
and Lee-Yariv (2014) give simple examples in which the unique NTU stable
matching is PAM, while the unique TU stable matching exhibits negative
assortative matching.
This does not mean that it is easy to discriminate between the two mod-
els empirically when only matching patterns can be observed. As we will see
in section 5.1, any matching is rationalizable under TU (and a fortiori under
NTU) once we allow for within-type variation in preferences. Echenique et
al (2013) explore the testable predictions of TU and NTU stable matchings
when the analyst observes all payoff-relevant characteristics of the agents2.
They first show that NTU matching is testable in this setting: there exist
2They use the term “aggregate matchings”; but their assumption is really about the
econometrician having highly disaggregated information.
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matchings that cannot be stable NTU matchings for any profile of prefer-
ences. They then prove that TU matching is strictly more restrictive than
NTU matching; in fact, any matching that is rationalizable by some pro-
file of preferences under TU is also rationalizable by a men-preferred (or a
women-preferred) NTU stable matching. This implies that it is impossible
to test TU versus NTU using only information about observed matches.
Clearly, however, the assumption that all matching-relevant information is
observed by the econometrician is excessively strong. It implies for instance
that observationally identical should always have observationally identical
matches. Most of this survey deals precisely with the ways this assumption
can be relaxed.
Introducing the possibility of transfers (given quasi-linear utilites) in
a NTU market clearly enhances the total joint surplus, since that is by
construction maximal under TU. Lee-Yariv (2014) show that in large one-
to-one matching markets, transfers are actually not always necessary for
efficiency purposes: for some classes of preferences, stable NTU matchings
are asymptotically efficient. On the other hand, for other specifications
allowing transfers has a large effect on efficiency. This is an area that cries
for more research.
Even in contexts in which transfers cannot be ignored, the standard TU
framework relies on a strong assumption—namely, that utility can be trans-
ferred between partners at a constant “exchange rate”. This has testable
consequences that may or may not be acceptable. Take, for instance, the
case of households who match on the market for marriage. The TU as-
sumption is only valid under specific individual preferences3; these in turn
imply that the household’s demand for goods is the same for all Pareto
efficient allocations. Therefore changes affecting the matching game (say,
variations in the composition of the populations of men and women), and
generally variations in the spouses’ respective weights cannot possibly affect
such household’s decisions as the amount spent on health care, education or
3Necessary and sufficient conditions for TU, that generalize previous contributions by
Bergstrom and Varian (1984) and Bergstrom and Cornes (1983), are provided in Chiap-
pori and Gugl (2014). Technically, the conditional indirect utility must be affine in the
(conditional) sharing rule.
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children expenditures. These restrictions may be excessive in some contexts.
Then it is necessary to generalize the basic model by allowing for a nonlin-
ear utility frontier. We will briefly describe such “imperfectly transferable
utility” (ITU) models, although to the best of our knowledge they have not
yet been taken to data.
1.2 Data and Theory
A second, recurrent theme of this survey will be that the econometrics of
matching models needs to combine data with theory judiciously. Unlike
single-agent models, matching models by definition involve at least two par-
ties; as a result they can give rise to much richer observable patterns, which
makes it much harder to identify parameters of interest without the help of
a well-defined theoretical structure.
To illustrate this, consider changes in assortative matching on the mar-
riage market over the past fifty years. Many social scientists have docu-
mented an increase in educational homogamy using descriptive statistics—
see for instance Schwartz and Mare (2005)4. But what lies behind this
increased homogamy? How much of it is due to changes in preferences, how
much to changes in the “supply” of partners by skill, how much to changes
in the returns to education on the labor market? Going beyond the causes,
which categories of men and women benefited from the resulting matching
patterns? As we will explain in more detail in section 3, the two-sided na-
ture of matching problems makes it particularly hard to interpret estimates
from descriptive techniques; a theoretical framework is essential to begin to
answer these questions.
This structure need not be very tightly specified, if the analyst can ob-
serve enough data. We will assume throughout that matching patterns
(“who matches with whom”) are observed, either in one large market or
in many markets that share some characteristics. In some data sets, infor-
mation about the dynamics of the matching process (e.g., on the various
offers made by each agent) is also available. Sometimes, as in employment
4In a similar vein, researchers have used duration data models for instance to describe
the increase in ages at marriage.
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relationships, transfers between agents (here the wage) are also recorded.
This is typically not the case in household economics, if only because trans-
fers are mostly implicit (e.g., they operate through changes in the structure
of household expenditures); however, in collective models of household be-
havior, transfers may often be at least partially identified when individual
consumption or labor supply functions are observable. The ability to recover
the intrahousehold distribution of resources and welfare indeed is a major
asset of matching models in family economics.
In some settings the data also contain useful proxies for “match output”
or “joint surplus.” When students are matched with schools, for instance,
their educational outcomes can often be observed. To some degree, wage
increases or separations also give information on match output in employ-
ment relationships; and one could argue that divorces and children outcomes
also proxy for marital output. Once again, observing such data allows the
analyst to relax theoretical restrictions and therefore the specification of the
model.
1.3 Empirical Approaches
Two broad types of empirical strategies have been followed so far in testing
and estimating matching models. On the one hand, some approaches ex-
plicitly introduce a stochastic structure at the level of individual matches;
a standard justification, that we shall discuss in more detail, is that the
corresponding random terms reflect some unobserved heterogeneity among
agents. These are interpreted as characteristics that all individuals observe,
and along which they match, but which are not available to the econome-
trician. Obtaining a useful characterization of the solutions of a matching
game explicitly involving random payoffs in its most general form is an ex-
tremely difficult problem. However, a complete characterization may obtain
under additional hypotheses regarding the stochastic process.
In the TU framework, identification can be achieved under a separabil-
ity property introduced by Choo-Siow (2006). Depending on the context,
identification may obtain from data relative to a single market; or it may
instead require the observation of several markets sharing structural char-
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acteristics, as discussed by Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2014) in the TU
context and by Hsieh (2011) in the NTU framework. Chiappori, Oreffice
and Quintana-Domeque (2012) have proposed a different approach, which
reduces the individual variation in preferences for partners: all individuals
agree on an “attractiveness index” that aggregates the traits of potential
partners. All these issues will be considered below.
Alternatively, some work relies on regularity conditions that all stable
matchings are assumed to satisfy. The rank-order properties introduced by
Fox (2010a, 2010b) belong to that family. We will discuss the underlying
theory, a related result by Graham (2011, 2013), and recent applications.
1.4 Scope of the survey
To keep our task manageable, we have had to make some difficult choices.
Much of our discussion bears on one-to-one matching, where the link be-
tween theory and empirics is the most straightforward. We will not cover
matching markets in which match output is observed, since the recent survey
by Graham (2011) does this very well; we refer the reader to his section 3.
On the other hand, we will explain how observed transfers can be taken into
account.
A common feature of all the matching models we study is the absence
of frictions: any participant in a matching game is supposed to have perfect
information about all possible mates, even in large markets. This sharply
contrasts with search models, in which frictions are explicitly modeled and
play a key role. We see the vast literature on matching in a search context
and in particular its more recent advances in labor economics5 as comple-
mentary to the frictionless view. Each approach exhibits specific advantages
and limitations, and the choice of one or another should primarily be driven
by the nature of the issue under consideration. For instance, models aimed
at explaining unemployment can hardly afford ignoring frictions; if, however,
the key issue under investigation is the matching of firms and top executive,
a frictionless benchmark may make perfect sense. Using the dynamic fea-
5In particular Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and the contributions that followed from
it.
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tures of search models is also more appealing when the data does indeed
follow agents matching over time; as we will explain in our conclusion, in
cross-sectional data the two approaches are essentially equivalent.
Clarifying the relationship between matching and search models from
an explicitly empirical perspective, is an important challenge to be faced
by future research. At any rate, we believe that a review of the recent
literature on search would go far beyond the scope of the present survey.
This literature, by its size, its scope, and its specificities, amply justifies an
independent presentation.
In the next section, we give a brief exposition of bilateral matching, fo-
cusing on the elements of the theory that are necessary to approach empirical
work. Section 3 gives an overview of the various empirical philosophies that
have guided the contributors to this literature. We describe work on NTU
models in section 4; and we move to TU models in section 5. We conclude




The theoretical frameworks that underpin most empirical work on matching
share a few basic features. First, they consider bipartite matching. We
start with two sets I and J of agents, whom we will refer to from now
on as “men” and “women”. Each of these sets can be endowed with a
measure (resp. µ and ν), which can be discrete or continuous but must
be finite. Any individual i ∈ I may be matched with an individual j ∈ J
or remain single, and conversely; to accommodate single men, we add two
dummy populations of null agents, denoted ∅, to J and I respectively, and
we extend the probabilities µ and ν accordingly (so that a Dirac mass equal
to the total mass of J is put on the dummy population added to I and
conversely.)
It is important to note at this point that very few restrictions are imposed
on the sets of male and female characteristics, I and J . In particular, we do
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not restrict their dimension to be one. Multidimensional matching received
scant attention until recently, but this trend is now being reversed; we will
cover some of the major contributions in this new direction.
Second, a matching defines who is matched with whom, or remains un-
matched. Technically, a matching is defined by a measure η on the product
space I × J ; intuitively, η (i, j) is the ‘’‘probability” that Mr i is matched
with Ms j. Obviously, such a measure must satisfy a feasibility constraint,
reflecting the fact that any given individual can be matched to one person at
most; formally, the marginals of η must therefore equal µ and ν respectively.
If for instance the sets I and J are finite, the feasibility constraint for Mr i
is simply ∑
j∈J
η(i, j) + η(i, ∅) = µ(i). (1)
Finally, the standard equilibrium concept is stability. We will return
to its definition, which is slightly different in the TU and the NTU cases.
Broadly speaking, a matching is stable if
(i) no matched individual would rather be single, and
(ii) no pair of individuals would both rather be matched together than
remain in their current situation.
The stability concept therefore involves robustness against deviations by
individuals and couples.
2.2 Bilateral matching under NTU
The last ingredient of a matching game are the payoffs; they are defined in
quite different ways with or without transfers. We start with the NTU case.
Here, matching Mr i with Ms j generates some utility for each of them; in
other words, the game is defined by two exogenous functions, U (i, j) and
V (i, j). By assumption, these utilities are fixed ; agents are not able, through
further trade, to increase a person’s utility while reducing the others (what
transfers would typically allow). They are primitives of the problem, and
may in principle be econometrically recovered if the model is identified.
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Stability has a very direct translation in the NTU context. Let u (i)
and v (j) denote the utility levels respectively reached by Mr i and Ms j
at a stable matching η. First, for any (i, j) belonging to the support of a
stable matching η (i.e., for any man-woman pair who marries with positive
probability), we require that:
u (i) = U (i, j) and v (j) = V (i, j)
Moreover, stability requires that:
u(i) = max
k∈J




{V (k, j) | U(k, j) ≥ u(k)}.
The first equation, for instance, simply states that
if U(i, k) > u(i) = U(i, j), then V (i, k) < v(k);
that is, any woman k whom i would strictly prefer to his current match j
must be strictly better off in her current situation than if she were matched
with i.
2.3 Bilateral matching under TU
Under TU, things are quite different. The primitive of the problem now
is a single function, s (i, j), usually called the (joint) surplus. The surplus
generated by any matched couple must be shared between the spouses; how-
ever, this sharing is now endogenous, and is typically determined (or at least
constrained) by the stability conditions. In practice, therefore, the match-
ing game is defined by the two sets I and J , together with the associated
measures µ and ν, and the function s.
A solution (a “matching”) is now defined by a measure η on the product
space and by two functions, u (i) and v (j), which describe the payoffs to
partners. In particular, these functions are such that for any couple matched
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with positive probability—that is, for any (i, j) in the support of η—we have:
u (i) + v (j) = s (i, j)
Stability has a simple translation; namely, for any (not necessarily matched)
pair (i, j), it must be that:
u (i) + v (j) ≥ s (i, j)
Indeed, if we had u(i) + v(j) < s(i, j) for some (i, j), then i and j could
match together and split the surplus in a way that gives i more than u(i)
and j more than v(j), contradicting the definition of u and v as equilibrium
payoffs.
The main theoretical result for the TU framework is the well-known
equivalence between stability and surplus maximization. Specifically, let us
forget for a minute the notion of stability and consider the following problem:
find a measure η on the product space I × J such that
(i) the marginals of η equal µ and ν respectively6




s (i, j) dη (i, j) .
Note that the problem just described is linear in its unknown, namely
the measure η. This linear programming problem admits a dual program,





u (i) dµ (i) +
∫
J
v (j) dν (j)
)
under the constraints
u (i) + v (j) ≥ s (i, j) for all i, j,
6That is, feasibility constraints like (1) must hold.
11
which are exactly the stability constraints stated above. It follows that if
a stable match exists, then the corresponding measure maximizes total sur-
plus; conversely, for any solution to the surplus maximization problem, one
can find the functions u and v by simply solving the (linear) dual problem—
which has a solution by standard duality results.
2.4 Bilateral matching under Imperfectly Transferable Util-
ity (ITU)
Finally, the ITU case can be seen as a direct generalization of the TU case.
The equation of the Pareto frontier generated by a couple (i, j) is no longer
linear; therefore the surplus function, s (i, j), is replaced with a function
F (i, j, v) that defines the maximum utility reachable by i when matched
with j, if j receives (at least) a utility equal to v. Again, the intra-couple
sharing (defined by the pair (u, v)) is endogenous, and is typically deter-
mined (or at least constrained) by the stability conditions. The matching
game is thus defined by the two measurable sets I and J , together with
the associated measures µ and ν, and the function F . As in the TU case,
a solution (a “matching”) is defined by a measure η on the product space
and by two functions, u (i) and v (j). These functions are such that for any
couple matched with positive probability—that is, for any (i, j) in to the
support of η—we have:
u (i) = F (i, j, v (j))
As before, stability has a simple translation; namely, for any (not necessarily
matched) pair (i, j), it must be that:
u (i) ≥ F (i, j, v (j))
The main advantage of the ITU model is its generality. In particular, it does
not imply that couples always behave like individuals—a property charac-
teristic of the TU framework (see Section 1.1). The price to pay is that we
lose the equivalence between stability and surplus maximization; in fact, the
mere notion of aggregate surplus can no longer be defined in that context.
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2.5 Hedonic models as matching models
Hedonic models study markets for goods and services that can be decom-
posed into a vector of attributes. An equilibrium then is characterized by
a price function, which describes the relationship between the attributes of
the good and the price at which it is traded (see for instance Heckman,
Matzkin and Nesheim 2010.) The general structure of an hedonic model
consists of three sets: a set I of “buyers” (together with a measure µ), a
set J of “sellers” (together with a measure ν) and a set K of “products”7.
Each product k has a price P (k), which is endogenously determined, as are
the matches between buyers and sellers. To put it concisely, equilibrium
determines who buys what from whom, and at which price.
We assume that each buyer i has quasi linear preferences of the form
U (i, k)−P (k); similarly, seller j maximizes her profit P (k)−c (j, k), where
c(j, ·) is a seller-specific cost function. An equilibrium is defined by a price
function P (k) such that when each buyer maximizes utility and each seller
maximizes profit, market clearing obtains for all products in K. Technically,
an equilibrium consists of a function P and a measure α on the product set
I × J ×K such that
(i) the marginal of α on I (resp. J) coincides with µ (resp. ν), and
(ii) for all (i, j, k) in the support of α,













)− c (j, k′)) .
In words, (i, j, k) belong to the support of α if, with positive probability,
buyer i consumes product k and seller j supplies product k.
As shown by Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2010), there exists a
canonical correspondance between hedonic models of the type just described
7Different interpretations are obviously possible; e.g. I could be the set of employers,
J the set of employees, and K the set of characteristics of potential jobs.
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and matching models under TU. Specifically, consider a hedonic model, and
define the surplus function s by:
s(i, j) = max
k∈K
(U(i, k)− c(i, k))
Let η be the marginal of α over I × J and define u (i) and v (j) by
u (i) = max
k∈K
(U (i, k)− P (k)) and v (j) = max
k∈K
(P (k)− c (j, k))
Then one can readily check that (η, u, v) defines a stable matching for the
matching problem defined on I × J by the surplus function s. Conversely,
starting from a stable matching (η, u, v), we know that
u(i) + v(j) ≥ s (i, j) ≥ U (i, k)− c (j, k) for all (i, j, k)
which implies that
c (j, k) + v (j) ≥ U (i, k)− u(i) for all (i, j, k) .
Any P (k) such that
inf
j∈J
{c (j, k) + v (j)} ≥ P (k) ≥ sup
i∈I
{U (i, k)− u (i)}
for all k is an equilibrium price function for the hedonic model.
The theory of (quasi-linear) hedonic models therefore has close ties with
that of matching models under TU. From an empirical point of view, though,
a key difference is that transfers between agents are much more likely to be
observed in hedonic models, via the price function P.
3 The Econometrics of Matching: Introductory
Remarks
Deterministic matching models tend to yield stark predictions, such as pos-
itive assortative matching. This obtains in models with one-dimensional
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characteristics when each agent’s utility is increasing in the partner’s type (in
the NTU case) or when the joint surplus is supermodular (for TU models—
see Becker 1973). If the relevant variable is, say, income, then the model
predicts that the richest man will marry the richest woman, the second
richest man will marry the second richest woman, and so on. While we
do observe a positive correlation between spouses’ income, perfect assorta-
tiveness of this type is of course counterfactual. Moreover, deterministic
models predict that observationally equivalent agents should have identical
matching outcomes—again not an empirically appealing feature.
To reconcile the highly restrictive predictions derived by this barebones
matching model with reality, two paths can be followed. One is to invoke
frictions. With imperfect and costly information and sequential meetings,
the wealthiest woman may well settle for a man who is high enough in the
income distribution, rather than wait for an hypothetical meeting with an
even wealthier mate. In addition, the randomness of the meetings process
guarantees that similar agents will have different types of partners in equi-
librium. Following the seminal contribution of Shimer and Smith (2000),
several authors have started to combine the search and the matching frame-
works8; for lack of space, we shall not cover this work in this survey.
Alternatively, one may maintain the frictionless context but enrich the
model by considering a multidimensional setting. While this is a first step to-
wards realism, it is not enough: to accommodate the dispersion in matching
outcomes of observationally equivalent agents, some of the relevant traits
must be unobservable to the econometrician. In other words, agents also
differ by some unobservable but matching-relevant heterogeneity, which is
modeled as a stochastic term. All structural models we consider below follow
this second direction, sometimes implicitly.
In all studies we know of (except some versions of hedonics models), the
stochastic term enters additively. Take the NTU context first: the utilities
generated by the matching of Mr i (with observable characteristics xi) and
8See Jacquemet and Robin (2012) and Gousse´ (2014).
15
Ms j (with observable characteristics yj) take the respective forms:
uij = U (xi, yj) + ε
m
ij and vij = V (xi, yj) + ε
w
ij (2)
where the shocks εm,wij reflect the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on
match quality.
Similarly, structural TU approaches postulate that the joint surplus gen-
erated by such a match can be written as
sij = s(xi, yj) + εij . (3)
Different studies have imposed very contrasted assumptions on the joint
distribution of these random terms. Some authors assume full independence;
in the TU model for instance, εij would be independent of xi, of yj , and of
all εkl unless i = k and j = l. Other postulate specific covariance structures.
To understand the issues at stake, it is useful to consider a special but widely
used example in which the observable traits x and y are discrete. Let for
instance x (resp. y) denote the wife’s (husband’s) education, with values in
some finite set. If say Mr i is particularly fond of educated partners, then
the distribution of εij will move to the right as yj increases. If moreover such
preferences are common among educated men, the distribution of εij will also
vary with xi. By contrast, independence imposes that Mr i’s idiosyncratic
preferences cannot be related to any of the observable characteristics of
her potential spouses. Of course, if independence is not imposed, then the
unconditional correlation structure of the εij ’s may exhibit specific patterns.
For instance, εij and εik will typically be correlated if i and k belong to the
same education class; and the identification strategy will have to take this
correlation structure into account.
Note that there are often strong theoretical arguments for not assuming
independence. Consider, for instance the matching model of Chiappori,
Iyigun and Weiss (2009), in which agents first invest in education and then
match on the marriage market. Agents differ ex ante by two idiosyncratic
characteristics, both unobservable to the econometrician: their willingness
to marry and their cost of acquiring education. The authors show that
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both aspects influence educational choices. In particular, agents with a high
preference for marriage are more likely to invest in education, since they are
more likely to reap returns from their education on the marriage market (a
better educated spouse, for instance.) In this context, modeling the marriage
market under the assumption that idiosyncratic preferences are independent
of education would be incorrect, since education is in fact endogenous to the
realization of preferences for marriage.
Another important simplification that much (but not all of) this litera-
ture relies on is that the markets considered are large. One can show that in
large matching markets, nothing is lost for inference9 by looking only at the
matching patterns conditional on the µ and ν’s marginal distributions.10
In a nutshell, assumptions regarding the joint distribution of the random
terms are far from innocuous; we shall explicitly discuss them in what fol-
lows. Testing between different stochastic specifications, however, is not an
easy task. As we will see, some empirical work uses data on (one or several)
large matching markets, while other work relies on exclusion restrictions
across markets to identify the primitives of the model11.
Sometimes the data restricts what can be done. For instance, it is often
easier to get data on realized matches than on unmatched agents. Then only
some patterns of the utilities or surplus can be identified. In the TU case for
instance, it is easy to see that with data on realized matches only, we can
only hope to identify the joint surplus up to a sum of an arbitrary function of
the man’s type and an arbitrary function of the woman’s type. Intuitively,
these functions describe the expected utility of marriage for the various types
of agents; and it stands to reason that we need data on unmatched agents
9Menzel (2015b) gives a rigorous argument proving that under reasonable conditions,
in large markets correlations across agents play a vanishing role in the likelihood function.
10In large markets, assuming independence of the match-specific random shocks has
another drawback. If the distribution of the random shock is unbounded (as is usually
assumed in empirical models), then, when the size of the market increases, the expected
utility of any given individual tends to become very large and mostly driven by the stochas-
tic component. The intuition is that utilities, in this context, are related to the maximum
of the shocks over all possible partners.
11We shall not consider here the empirical contributions that rely on calibration or
simulation, and do not offer an econometric analysis in the strict sense (for instance the
recent work on CEO compensation by Gabaix-Landier 2008 and Edmans et al 2009.)
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to identify them.
Before we proceed, it is important to mention that there is a wealth of
descriptive empirical work by demographers and sociologists on assortative
matching. Their empirical strategy is often based on the analysis of variance
framework. They assume that men and women belong to a finite (and
usually small) set of types; these can be income or age brackets, education
levels or others. They define an index of homogamy Hxy for each pair of
observed types (x, y) of men and women; and they run a regression of the
form
Hxy = ax + by + ξxy,
where ax and by can be flexible functions of observables relating to men
of type x and to women of type y, respectively. Then they interpret the
contributions to the explained variance of the a, b and ξ terms.
The problem with this approach is that it negates the equilibrium effects—
what Choo and Siow (2006) call “spillover effects”. Whether the relevant
model allows for transfers or not, the number of matches between types x
and y is a function of all proportions of types: µ(x) and ν(y) certainly, but
also all µ(x′) and ν(y′) for x 6= x′, y 6= y′. If for instance the proportion of
men of a given type increases, it is likely to increase the proportion of single
men of all similar types. As a consequence, these regressions omit many
relevant variables and their results are very hard to interpret.12 The key
conclusion, here, is that since the equilibrium number of matches between
types x and y depends in a very nonlinear and asymmetric manner on all
µ(x′) and ν(y′), this methodological issue is not easy to solve: without a
structural model, it is very hard to guess which of these many variables
should be added to the regression, and how.
12Chiappori and Salanie´ (2014) give a telling example. They generate data from a
Choo-Siow model for different distributions of men and women across the various types,
keeping structural preferences for homogamy unchanged. ANOVA regressions on such data
conclude that the contributions of the various terms to total variance have changed, which
the applied literature typically (and mistakenly) interprets as a change in preferences for
homogamy.
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4 The NTU Case
A host of applied theory contributions have been devoted to matching prob-
lems in a NTU framework. Following Roth’s (1984) seminal contribution,
which studies the market for new doctors in the U.S., many papers have
considered various markets for medical interns and residents, but also the
allocation of children to public schools (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez 2003,
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth 2005, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2005) or
the organ exchange programs between hospitals (Ashlagi and Roth 2012),
to name just a few. This body of literature often adopts a normative ap-
proach: it aims at constructing an algorithm that would solve the matching
problem under specific requirements (stability, incentive compatibility, etc.).
These contributions are not covered by our survey, which concentrates on
the econometrics of matching.
Still, several recent articles explicitly address estimation and testing of
a NTU matching model. Referring to the distinction made earlier between
“structural” and “reduced form” approaches, these contributions generally
follow the structural path. In this context, two types of econometric works
can be found, depending on the data that are available. In some cases,
the econometrician only observes the final matching (or the corresponding
contingency table, indicating, for discrete characteristics, the size of the
sample for each combination of male and female traits). However, some
authors observe not only the final match, but also the entire dynamics of the
matching game. For instance, data from online dating sites typically include
the set of potential partners an individual has considered (by clicking on their
file). Clearly, such data have a stronger empirical content; in particular,
they may allow to directly estimate agents’ preferences, independently of
the realized match.
4.1 Direct identification of preferences
Hitsch, Hortacsu and Ariely (2010—from now on HHA) consider matching
on online dating sites. This is a context in which an NTU approach makes
sense, since the corresponding technology does not allow for transfers of any
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type. Specific to their data is the fact that they can observe not only the final
matching, but also all the potential partners whom any given agent contacts
(“clicks”). They rely on a search-and-matching model by Adachi (2003),
in which agents optimally fix an “attractiveness threshold” and propose to
(here click) all potential mates above the threshold. Adachi shows that the
outcome of the search model converges to a stable matching when frictions
vanish. Assuming away strategic behavior (e.g., not contacting one’s favorite
choice because (s)he is considered as “out of reach”), an agent’s clicking
strategy thus gives a direct indication of his/her preferences, which can be
recovered using standard, discrete choice approaches.
In practice, HHA consider stochastic utilities of the type (2); in addition,
they assume that
εij = αi + ε˜ij and ηij = βj + η˜ij
where α, β are individual fixed effects and the random shocks ε˜ij and η˜ij
are iid and extreme value distributed. As explained earlier, this assumption
of independence (across partners, and from observed characteristics) is very
strong; but it makes it very easy to estimate the model, using fixed effects
logit. Finally, having estimated preferences, HHA can apply a Gale-Shapley
algorithm to recover the predicted, stable matchings. They find that the
predicted matches are similar to the actual matches achieved by the dating
site, and that the actual matches are approximately efficient.
Banerjee et al (2013) exploit matrimonial advertisements in a major In-
dian newspaper to study the relative importance of in-caste preferences and
preferences for other characteristics. To do so, their paper imposes strong
symmetry assumptions on preferences. They document a strong preference
for in-caste marriage; interestingly, this does not seem to interfere much
with preferences over education for instance. This may help explain the
persistence of castes in India.
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4.2 Using matching patterns only
Other approaches use data relative to realized matches only. In some cases,
however, information is available about behavior, which can be directly used
for the estimation process. One of the first contributions along this line is
due to del Boca and Flinn (2014, from now on DBF.) The basic insight can be
summarized as follows. DBF assume that household allocation decisions are
made according to a rule which is exogenously given—in sharp contrast to a
standard TU framework, in which sharing rules are an equilibrium outcome.
DBF consider either non cooperative Nash equilibrium or the maximization
of a weighted sum of individual utilities, with the weights as parameters to
be empirically identified.
For any given rule, the observation of household behavior allows DBF
to recover the parameters characterizing the preferences and (household)
productivities of both spouses. In turn, this allows to construct preference
orderings for each male over all possible females and conversely; note that
these preferences are recovered conditionally on the decision rule, and entail
a random component as described above. Finally, they apply the Gale and
Shapley algorithm to determine a stable matching of the game thus defined,
and compare the correspondence between predicted and observed matches
using a likelihood-based metric, that can be used to determine the decision
rule and the relevant parameter.
A different path is followed by Boyd et al. (2013), who analyze the match-
ing of public school teachers to jobs over several years. Their approach is
more explicitly structural. They start from stochastic utilities of the type
(2) with a parametric representation of the deterministic components, and
assume that the random shocks are independent. A first remark is that, for
any random draw of the stochastic shocks, the Gale Shapley algorithm gen-
erates a stable matching, for which a set of descriptive statistics (in terms
of correlations between attributes) can be computed. This suggests using
a method of simulated moments in order to select the values of parameters
that fit best the moments observed in the real data. While remarkably pow-
erful, such simulation-based approaches are computationally cumbersome,
and may become impractical when the number of players becomes large.
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To circumvent the computational problem, Hsieh (2011) uses a modified
version of the Gale -Shapley algorithm that allows to directly compute the
contingency table of marriage types without explicitly solving for the stable
matching. He considers a model in which women and men can be categorized
into M and N types respectively: xi ∈ {1, ...,M} and yj ∈ {1, ..., N}.
As above, an individual’s spousal preference is the sum of a deterministic
term that depends on the agent’s and the potential partner’s type, and of a
random term; but the latter only depends on the partner’s type:
uij = V (xi, yj) + εi (yj) and vij = V (xi, yj) + ηi (xi)
In particular, each agent equally values his/her potential partners who be-
long to the same category.
Unlike in DBF, no behavior is observed; identification comes only from
the observation of matching patterns. Hsieh shows that stability is not
testable from the observation of a single market: any contingency table can
be rationalized as a stable matching for well chosen functions. However,
when we observe several markets with the same deterministic functions and
the same stochastic distributions, stability generates testable predictions.
Moreover, the model is parametrically identified.
4.3 Extensions
Agarwal (2014) notes that sometimes it is reasonable to assume that one
side of the market is only vertially differentiated. For instance, in the resi-
dent matching program hospitals seem to agree on their ranking of potential
residents. This considerably reduces the scope for deviations and makes an
estimator based on pairwise stability conditions quite manageable. Agarwal
uses this insight to criticize the argument that the resident matching pro-
gram unfairly reduces the salaries of residents. He shows that low salaries
can in fact be rationalized as the price residents pay for valuable training in
the better hospitals.
Finally, a wide-ranging contribution by Menzel 2015a obtains very strong
results on large matching markets. Following Dagsvik 2000, Menzel assumes
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that preferences on each side of the market are a function of observed char-
acteristics and of an unobserved shock; for instance,
Uij = U(xi, yj) + ζij
represents the utility man i derives from a match with woman j. In large
markets, any man has many potential matches; and it is intuitively clear
that the maximum of these utilities over willing partners will play an im-
portant role in the theory. Now in statistics, extreme value theory shows
that the (properly standardized) maximum of a large number of indepen-
dent and identically distributed random variable can only converge to one
of three parameter-free distributions. One of these is the type I extreme
value distribution that figures prominently in discrete choice econometrics,
as well as in this survey.
Menzel assumes that the ζ’s (and the corresponding shocks for women)
are iid across i and j, and that the tail distribution of these shocks belongs to
the class that yields convergence of the maximum to the type I EV distribu-
tion. He then takes the “very large market” limit13. He shows that in every
stable matching, the number of matches between partners of characteristics
x and y satisfies
η(x, y)
η(x, 0)η(0, y)
= exp(U(x, y) + V (x, y)). (4)
Menzel’s analysis therefore yields a remarkably simple formula, that only
relies on a fairly weak restriction on the form of the distribution of errors—
but a strong one on their iid character. It also shows that the observed
matches are informative only about the quasi-surplus14 (U+V ). Data on the
observed matches is not enough to separate the preferences U and V of both
sides of the market. On the other hand, it is possible to compute expected
utilities at a stable matching: in the large market limit, they coincide with
13This involves much work and technical details that we cannot discuss here.
14It may seem surprising that adding U and V makes sense in an NTU world; but note
that the assumption that shocks are identically distributed for men and women introduces
an implicit normalization of utility scales.
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minus the logarithm of the share of unmatched agents, as in the Choo and
Siow paper discussed in 5.1.
5 Matching under TU
The structural approaches to TU matching all consider surplus functions
entailing an additive, random shock as in (3). Even under this restricted
form, identifying both the function s and the distribution of εij conditional
on (xi, yj) is a difficult task. To understand why, consider an alternative
model of marriage for a moment: we observe women j with observable
characteristics yj choosing men i with observable characteristics i; men have
no say in the matter, and get zero surplus in their imposed marriage.
This alternative, one-sided specification is simply a discrete choice model
in which woman j chooses a man i by maximizing s(xi, yj) + εij . While
this model is identified under theoretically reasonable conditions (Berry and
Haile 2010), it is still a very hard model to estimate without strong paramet-
ric assumptions. The reason is simple: even if we assume that the ε terms are
distributed independently of xi and yj , and identically and independently
across women, if observable characteristics of men take M values then the
joint distribution of the ε’s is M -dimensional. Its variance-covariance ma-
trix, for instance, has M(M−1)/2−1 degrees of freedom after the standard
normalizations are applied.
The two-sided matching model is an order of magnitude more complex
of course. From section 2.3, the individual utilities ui and vj associated with
the stable matching solve the coupling equations:
ui = max
j∈J




(s (xi, yj) + εij − ui) .
Each of these two systems of equations has the structure of a one-sided
choice model; but the key difference is that the choice models of men and
of women are coupled through the equilibrium constructs ui and vj . This is
24
a specific feature of the TU framework, as opposed to NTU models. This,
along the fact that we cannot safely assume that the unobservable ε’s are
independent across i or j, greatly complicates identification.
Since fully nonparametric identification is out of the question, we must
impose restrictions on the function s, which we will call the “mean sur-
plus”15, and on the conditional distribution of the unobservable ε’s. A
useful way of contrasting existing empirical approaches to matching models
under TU is in whether they choose to impose stronger restrictions on s or
on ε.
A first group of methods, pioneered by Choo and Siow (2006), does not
impose any restriction on the mean surplus s; on the other hand, it restricts
the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity εij and derives implications
for matching patterns. By contrast, Fox (2010a) has proposed and used an
approach which does not explicitly specify the distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity. Instead it directly postulates a “rank-order property” that
imposes restrictions on the relationship between matching patterns and the
surplus function.
Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque (2012) use a different semi-
parametric idea: they assume that the joint surplus has an “index” struc-
ture, in the sense that it is weakly separable into two one-dimensional func-
tions of female and male characteristics respectively. As we will see, this
allows them to run simple regressions to estimate the index, and to test the
index assumption.
Finally, Fox, Hsu and Yang (2015) take the opposite approach to Choo
and Siow: they restrict the specification of the mean surplus s in order to
identify the distribution of the unobservables ε. The simplest version of
their model assumes that the mean surplus s is observed for every possi-
ble match and that the ε’s are distributed independently of s. They show
that if the analyst observes many markets with different mean surplus but
the same distribution for the unobservables, then the distribution of the
complementarities across unobservables is identified.
15We use the term “mean” by analogy with discrete choice models, although, as we will
see, s is not equal to the sum of average equilibrium utilities.
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We now present these four approaches in more detail.
5.1 Separable Surplus
Remember that in equation (3), we associated to each potential match of a
man i and a woman j a joint surplus
sij = s(xi, yj) + εij ;
and we now normalize the mean surplus s to be zero for singles16.
Now consider the stability problem from the perspective of aggregate
surplus maximization. For each realization of the ε’s, we have a well-posed
maximization problem, which has a solution: a measure η which gives match-
ing patterns, and associated dual variables u, v that describe equilibrium
utilities17. These dual variables are now random, as for any given (x, y),
different realizations of the ε’s generate different dual variables. Knowing
the distribution of the ε’s, is it possible to infer the distribution of the dual
functions u and v?
To the best of our knowledge, little is known about this question, except
in a specific case, initially considered by Choo-Siow (2006), and on which
much of the relevant literature is based. It relies on two crucial assump-
tions:18
1. The observable characteristics x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are discrete; they
define a finite number of categories, each of which contains a continuum
of individuals.
2. The surplus function is additively separable in the unobserved com-
ponents of both partners. That is, for any match of a man i and a
woman j, the surplus generated can be written





16Formally, we let s(x, ∅) = s(∅, y) = 0 for all x and y.
17With finite populations, the solution η is generically unique but the u and v are not
uniquely defined. In large markets they converge to a unique solution.
18In addition, Choo and Siow assume that the random terms follow an extreme value
distribution. However, this assumption can be dispensed of—see below.
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The separability assumption allows for any type of complementarity be-
tween observable characteristics; but it rules out any complementarity be-
tween unobservable characteristics. The term αyi , for instance, could reflect
an idiosyncratic preference of man i for women of category y, or a preference
of women of type y for man i, or some interaction in domestic production.
Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2014) showed that given these assump-
tions, there exists a decomposition
s(x, y) ≡ U(x, y) + V (x, y)
such that, at any stable matching a man i will be matched with a partner19
whose category y maximizes U(xi, y)+α
y
i ; moreover, i’s utility at equilibrium



















(first choose the category of your partner, then a partner within that cate-
gory.) We can pull out α
yj






















(U(xi, y) + α
y
i ) ,
as announced; and by the same token, v(j) = maxx∈X
(





19Again, we are allowing for unmatched agents—then y = ∅.
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This result is important for two reasons. First, it gives an exact char-
acterization of the stochastic distribution of the dual variables, which are a
major outcome of interest in many applications (including household eco-
nomics.) Second, and from a more practical viewpoint, it leads to a simple
characterization of individual choices that links them directly to standard,
discrete choice models.
5.1.1 Identification
This setting can be analyzed from a general perspective, as in Galichon-
Salanie´ (2014). Take a man i whose category is x; and suppose that the
distribution of the vector of shocks (αyi ) for all values of y ∈ Y is Px. Note
that Px is a multidimensional distribution, and that it may vary with x.
Similarly, denote Qy the distribution of the vector of shocks (β
x
j ) for all val-
ues of x ∈ X. Galichon and Salanie´ prove that the distribution of matching





η(x, y)s(x, y) + E(η)
)
(6)
where the generalized entropy E is a concave function whose specific form
depends on the distributions Px and Qy.
As a consequence the matching patterns η are linked to the unknown
mean surplus s by a simple formula; and so is the distribution of utilities.
Galichon and Salanie´ also provide an algorithm to solve for the optimal
matching η that is very fast in leading examples.
Econometricians are in fact interested in the inverse problem: given the
observation of the marginals µ and ν and the matching patterns η, what
can we infer on the mean surplus s and the distributions Px and Qy?
First assume that we only observe data from one large matching market—
say, marriages in America in 2013. Galichon and Salanie´ prove that for any
possible choice of the distributions Px and Qy, the relationship between
matching patterns η and mean surplus s is one-to-one; that is, any match-
ing pattern can be rationalized by one and only one surplus function. In
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other terms, given exact knowledge of the Px and Qy, the mean surplus s is
nonparametrically just identified.
Take for instance the most common assumption, namely that the α’s
and β’s follow standard type-I extreme value distributions; then the choice
of a spouse can be modeled using a standard multilogit model. This was
the path followed by Choo-Siow (2006). Then the generalized entropy is the
standard measure of entropy; and we obtain the formula
s (x, y) = ln
η (x, y)2
η (x, ∅) η (∅, y) (7)
(remember that η(x, ∅) is the probability of an unmatched man of type x.)
This expression can also be written as:
ln η (x, y) =
1
2
s (x, y) +
1
2
ln η (x, ∅) + 1
2
ln η (∅, y) (8)
Note the similarity with equation (4) of Menzel (2015a). The only differ-
ence is the “square” exponent—but that is an important one as it involves
the scaling properties of the equilibrium. It is fair to say that at this stage,
the underlying differences are not well-understood.
The multilogit model fixes all Px and Qy distributions to be one and the
same: no heteroskedasticity, and no correlation in preferences over partners.
For instance, it imposes both that the dispersion of preferences of men of
type x be independent of x, and that the idiosyncratic preferences of any
such man over women of types y and z be independent.
These are extremely strong assumptions; one of their consequences, as
pointed out in Siow (2009), is that we can test for complementarities just by
looking at the total positivity of observed matching patterns. Moreover, they
imply specific predictions in terms of comparative statics of the model—see
Decker et al (2012). As shown by Galichon and Salanie´, only some of these
predictions hold for all separable surplus functions.
Yet the results of Galichon-Salanie´ show that any more flexible choice
of the distribution is underidentified from cross-sectional data, and the just
identification result implies that we cannot test any assumption on the dis-
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tributions Px and Qy. There are only three ways out of this dilemma:
1. we can use data on several markets, using well-chosen exclusion re-
strictions
2. we can impose parametric or semiparametric assumptions on the mean
surplus s and the distributions Px and Qy
3. using data on transfers would also give useful information that allows
the researcher to identify more features of the surplus function s and
the distributions P ’s and Q’s.
Using observations on transfers is discussed in Section 6. In section 5.1.5,
we will describe how Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2014) combine the first
two approaches to estimate and test a heteroskedastic model.
Finally, a recent contribution by Mourifie´ and Siow (2014) generalizes
the basic Choo-Siow version by replacing (8) with:
ln η (x, y) =
1
2
s (x, y) + a ln η (x, ∅) + b ln η (∅, y)
where a and b are parameters that can be interpreted as representing peer
and/or scale effects. The authors note that this formulation encompasses,
as particular cases, not only the standard Choo-Siow framework (which
correspond to a = b = 1/2), but also the Dagsvik-Menzel setting (a = b = 1),
the heteroskedastic version of Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2014), and
possibly other models as well. The price to pay is that the model has
no natural, structural interpretation. For instance, it does not necessarily
belong to either the TU or the NTU framework.
5.1.2 Sign-based Identification
The results by Galichon and Salanie´ (2014) nonparametrically identify the
mean surplus when the distributions of the unobservables are separable and
known. Now assuming perfect knowledge of the distribution of the un-
observables is quite strong; what can we identify if we only make weaker
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assumptions? Graham (2011, 2013) gives such a result under separabil-
ity, using only information on matches. His Theorem 4.1 shows that if the
analyst only assumes that unobservables are independently and identically
distributed, then the sign of the complementarities
C(x, y, x′, y′) = s(x, y) + s(x′, y′)− s(x, y′)− s(x′, y) (9)
is identified.
To understand Graham’s result, it is useful to consider the simpler dis-
crete choice model in which man i of type x chooses among women of type
y by maximizing
U(x, y) + αyi .
Now if the αyi are iid over y, the monotonicity result of Manski (1975) shows
that the probability η(x, y) that such a man chooses a woman of type y is
an increasing function of the mean utility U(x, y). In particular, the sign of
U(x, y′)− U(x, y) is that of η(x, y′)− η(x, y) and is therefore identified.
The same argument applies to women, with V (x, y) = s(x, y)− U(x, y);
and expanding the complementarity in (9), it is easy to see that if
min
(




η(x′, y), η(x, y′)
)
then the complementarity C(x, y, x′, y′) is positive. Graham’s more refined
result follows from similar arguments.
While identifying the sign of the complementarities may not sound that
exciting, complementarities lie at the heart of matching as we have known
since Becker (1973). It also gives a rigorous foundation for Fox’s rank-order
based approach (2010a), which we describe in section 5.2. The price to
pay is the assumption that unobserved heterogeneities are identically and
independently distributed, which seems very strong.
5.1.3 Continuous Separable Models
The general framework of separable models described above need not be
restricted to discrete characteristics such as diploma or race. In fact, the
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general ideas in Galichon and Salanie´ (2014) can be extended to continuously
distributed characteristics like income. Several technical difficulties must be
faced, however. The first, obvious one is that standard discrete choice models
such as the multinomial logit behave badly when taken to the continuous
limit. Suppose for instance that mean utilities (Uj) are iid; then if J is a
continuous set, maxj∈J (Uj + εj) is infinite unless the (εj)’s have a bounded
support.
A first way of solving this problem, pioneered by Dagsvik (1994), is to
assume that each agent is only confronted by a countable set of choices—
technically, a random draw from a Poisson process whose intensity is gov-
erned by a standard type-I extreme value distribution. Dupuy and Galichon
(2014) show how this can be extended to the matching framework. In this
setting, each woman for instance can only match with men whom she met;
and this meeting process is random and governed by a Poisson process, much
as it is in the job search literature. The great appeal of this approach is that
the probability density that a woman of type y matches with a man of type
x is a direct continuous analog of the logit formula:
η(x|y) = exp(U(x, y))∫
exp(U(z, y))dz
.
Dupuy and Galichon also describe a version of this model in which the mean
joint surplus of an (x, y) pair is bilinear in types:
Φ(x, y) = x′Ay
where A is an “affinity matrix.” This yields very simple formulæ and a direct
way of selecting relevant characteristics by a singular value decomposition
of A.
One can also restrict the stochastic specification of joint surplus so that
the infinity problem disappears. To take a very simple example, suppose
that x and y are the incomes of man i and woman j. Men and women have
different “bliss points” for the income gap within the couple. This could be
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described by a joint surplus like
−a(x− y − αi)2 − b(x− y − βj)2,
which allows for variation in the intensity of preferences across genders, and
for idiosyncratic variation in the bliss points. This is clearly separable, since
there is no interaction term between the α’s and β’s. Moreover, the joint
surplus is bounded above and so must expected utilities in every match-
ing. Chiappori, Galichon and Salanie´ (in progress) studies the conditions
under which the discrete separable approach can be extended to continuous
characteristics.20
5.1.4 ITU Models
The techniques just described may in some cases be extended to the ITU
case. While such an extension raises specific difficulties, due in particular
to the non linearities introduced by the ITU framework, these difficulties
are not insuperable; see Galichon, Kominers and Weber (2014) for recent
advances on this topic.
5.1.5 Empirical applications and results
In the paper that introduced separable matching, Choo-Siow (2006a) ex-
plored the welfare effects of the 1973 legalization of abortion in the US.
Given their specification, the change in the expected utility of men of age x
is directly related to the change in their probability of staying single. Choo
and Siow rely on the variation on the legal status of abortion across US states
before 1973 to obtain a difference-of-differences estimate of the welfare ef-
fects. As expected, these effects are concentrated on women of childbearing
age and the men who marry them. They estimate that 20 to 30 percent of
the observed fall in the marriage rates of young men can be attributed to
Roe vs Wade; and that it also contributed to delaying marriage.
20Finally, a continuum economy can also be represented as the limit of a discrete econ-
omy. This is done in a non-separable NTU setting by Menzel (2015a), which we discussed
in Section 4.3.
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Choo-Siow (2006b) used the same framework, augmented to allow for
cohabitation, to examine the effects of the baby boom in Canada. They
find that men benefited from the baby boom, while women did not. The
baby boom was gender-neutral in its effect on birth rates; but preferences
of men and women differ, on age at marriage in particular. Women prefer
earlier marriage, while men can more easily wait. The baby boom benefited
men born in its early years by making young women more plentiful. Choo
and Siow’s estimates confirm that the baby boom increased the net gains of
marriage to men born between 1940 and 1955 and lowered them for women
born before 1960.
The simplicity of the Choo and Siow model, in its “logit” implementa-
tion, yields predictions that are very stark. For instance, in their setting,
just as in the original Becker model, positive assortative matching is exactly
equivalent to positive complementarity in the joint surplus. Siow (2009)
exploits this property to provide strong evidence for educational comple-
mentarities in surplus, especially in cities.
Several papers have gone beyond the separable logit. Galichon and
Salanie´ (2014) revisit Choo and Siow’s results using their more flexible ap-
proach; in particular, they estimate a model with random coefficients that
has quite different comparative statics outcomes than the Choo and Siow
model. Chiappori, Salanie´ and Weiss (2014) pool data from thirty cohorts
of American men and women in order to explore changes in the returns to
education on the marriage market. By restricting the variation in the joint
surplus across cohorts, they are able to identify the changes in the “mar-
ital college premium” over the post-WWII period. They find that having
a college (or higher) education has benefited women more and more over
time, partly by reducing the likelihood that they stay single and partly by
improving their bargaining position within the couples they form.
Finally, Dupuy-Galichon (2014) applied their model of matching on con-
tinuous types to data from the DNB Household Survey. They focussed on
several groups of characteristics: education, health, physical measurements,
and personality traits (the “big five”, and attitudes towards risk.) Their
estimates and tests on the affinity matrix show that sorting occurs on sev-
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eral dimensions: personality traits matter as well as education. Preferences
over personality traits vary across genders, and the matching patterns of
individuals with different traits also differ markedly.
5.2 The Rank-order Approach
The results obtained by Choo and Siow (2006a) and their subsequent ex-
tension by Galichon and Salanie´ (2012) rely on a parametric specification
of the stochastic terms in the joint surplus, while possibly leaving the non-
stochastic part fully flexible. By the standards of the semiparametric litera-
ture, this is an unusual modeling choice: much of semiparametric economet-
ric theory has dedicated itself to relaxing assumptions on the distribution of
error terms. Several important papers have followed this alternative route.
The most influential approach is that proposed by Jeremy Fox, which he has
articulated in several papers (Fox 2010a,b, Fox and Bajari 2013.)
A common feature of these papers is that they rely on a “rank-order prop-
erty;” but this property differs across papers. For notational simplicity, we
will continue to confine our discussion to one-to-one, bipartite matching—
the marriage problem. It is worth stressing here that because Fox’s approach
only relies on pairwise stability, it can be applied more widely, to many-to-
one or even many-to-many matching.
Unlike Choo-Siow (2006a), who work with one large market, Fox (2010a)
seeks to identify the surplus function s by comparing matchings from a col-
lection of independent finite-size markets. The term “independent” here
means that individuals cannot match across market boundaries. Fox as-
sumes that the mean surplus function s(x, y) is the same in all of these
markets; his aim is to recover estimates of s(x, y) while imposing few re-
strictions on the stochastic part.
Denote Cn the list of observable characteristics on market n, and An
the observed matching (the list of (xi, yj) matches and of single men and
women.) If on each market the observed matching is stable given the list of
characteristics on that market, it follows that An maximizes the total surplus
given the constraints imposed by the draw of observable characteristics Cn
and of unobserved characteristics ε on market n. Now take any possible list
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of observed characteristics C. Given a large number of markets, there will be
many whose list of characteristics is close to C—with very similar numbers of
white college-educated men, of Hispanic high-school graduate women, etc.
The data therefore identify Pr(A|C), the probability that such a market
has given matching patterns over observable characteristics—say, a given
number of marriages between a white college-educated man and a Hispanic
high-school graduate woman. Note that the reason that Pr(A|C) is not
concentrated over one particular matching is that even markets with exactly
the same distribution of observed characteristics have different distributions
of unobserved characteristics. This is a consequence of the assumption that
each of these markets is “small.”
Now the knowledge of Pr(A|C) is clearly not enough to completely char-
acterize the joint surplus function. But sometimes we are only interested in
those of its features that only depend on observed characteristics, that is in
the mean surplus s(x, y). Suppose that for given C, Pr(A|C) is an increasing
function of
∑
(i,j)∈A s(xi, yj), so that







Fox (2010a) shows that under this rank-order property, if the distribution
of observed characteristics has continuous support then comparing markets
with the same C but different A identifies the function s up to a monotonic
transformation.
The rank-order property at first seems to be a natural extension of the
monotonicity in the usual single-agent discrete choice models. Such mod-
els have a 0-1 variable y determined by whether some index F (x) is large
enough:
y = 1 iff F (x) > ε.
If the distribution of ε is independent of x, then clearly Pr(y = 1|x) is an
increasing function of F (x).
Unfortunately, such monotonic behavior is rare in matching models: the
intution above just does not carry over to two-sided markets. Fox (2010a)
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argues, on the basis of simulations, that the rank-order property holds ap-
proximately if εij is iid across matches (i, j). But take separable models for
instance: the rank-order property only applies if we can neglect the general-
ized entropy term in equation (6), so that the optimal matching maximizes∑
x,y η(x, y)s(x, y). Since the entropy term scales like the dispersion of the
unobserved heterogeneity term, the rank-order property can only be a good
approximation if these “fixed effects” are negligible.
When it applies, the rank-order property lends itself very well to an
estimation approach based on inequalities. Suppose for instance that the
matchings A1 and A2 above only differ in that the partners w and w
′ of
two men m and m′ have been switched. Then the rank-order property, if it
holds, implies that
Pr(A1|C) > Pr(A2|C) iff s(xi, yj) + s(xi′ , yj′) > s(xi′ , yj) + s(xi, yj′).
Any such inequality generates information on the function s; given enough
such inequalities, the function s can be identified. Moreover, its unknown
parameters β0 can be estimated using maximum score (Manski 1975.) To
see this, take any 4-tuple (x, y, x′, y′). The rank-order property implies that
we are more likely to observe matches of x with y and of x′ with y′ if
C(x, y, x′, y′, β0) ≡ s(x, y, β0) + s(x′, y′, β0)− s(x, y′, β0)− s(x′, y, β0)








C(xi, yi, xj , yj , β) > 0
)
,
where the sums extend over the different markets n and over the matches
i = (xi, yi) and j = (xj , yj) observed in each market. The set of values
of β that maximize this score function converges to β0 as the number of
markets becomes large. The function F is discontinuous, but the score
can be smoothed (Horowitz 1992.) Moreover, the analyst need not use all
matches i and j on each market; she only needs to select enough of them
that a unique estimate of β0 is obtained.
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Note that the validity of a maximum score estimator only requires that
the sign of the complementarities C in the mean surplus s can be inferred
from the matching patterns η(x, y). Graham’s (2013) result of section 5.1.2
in particular shows that this holds in separable models when the distribu-
tions of heterogeneity terms are iid for each gender; this gives a primitive
justification for the large market rank order property in both Fox and Bajari
(2013) and Fox (2010b), and therefore a rigorous justification for the use of
a maximum score approach in these context.
Fox-Bajari (2013) also propose a maximum score estimator based on a
rank-order property. Their paper, however, assumes data on only one large
matching market. Their version of the rank-order property is that of Fox
(2010b, section 3.1). For simplicity again, assume as in section 5.1 that the
observed characteristics x and y can only take a finite number of values, and
denote η(x, y) the number of matches between men of type x and women
of type y on the market. The “one large market” version of the rank-order
property states that
s(x, y) + s(x′, y′) > s(x, y′) + s(x′, y)
if and only if
η(x, y)η(x′, y′) > η(x, y′)η(x′, y).
Unlike the “many small markets” version, this rank-order property can be
derived from more primitive assumptions. For simplicity, assume that x and
y are continuously distributed one-dimensional attributes. Then it is easy











for some increasing function F such that F (0) = 0. In particular, choosing
F (x) = 2x gives
s(x, y) = 2 log η(x, y) + a(x) + b(y);
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but as we saw in section 5.1, this is precisely the equation that identifies the
surplus in the Choo and Siow (2006) specification. Therefore the “one large
market” rank-order property applies in the Choo and Siow model. We do
not know which other primitive assumptions yield (10); it does not apply in
the heteroskedastic Choo and Siow specification of Chiappori, Salanie´ and
Weiss (2014) for instance.
Finally, it bears repeating that the techniques described in this subsec-
tion can readily be extended to many to-one or many-to-many matching.
Fox and Bajari 2013 illustrates the former by estimating a structural model
of the FCC spectrum auctions; and Fox 2010b takes this approach to the
(many-to-many) relationships between car producers and seller of car parts.
5.3 Index-based Approaches
One approach investigates the conditions under which such a model can
actually be analyzed using one-dimensional tools. This is the case, for in-
stance, if the various components of x and y only enter payoffs through
one-dimensional indices, A (x) and B (y). Such a property in turn has em-
pirically testable consequences that are analyzed by Chiappori, Oreffice and
Quintana-Domeque (2012, from now on COQ). Specifically, they consider a
model in which each potential wife, say i ∈ I, is characterized by a vector
xi =
(
x1i , ..., x
K
i
) ∈ RK of observable characteristics, and by some vector of
unobservable characteristics εi ∈ RN ; similarly, man j ∈ J is defined by a
vector of observable variables yj =
(




∈ RL and some unobservable
characteristics νj ∈ RN , where the random components ν and ε are drawn
from continuous and atomless distributions.
COQ assume that both the surplus function and the distribution of un-
observables only depends on the observable characteristics through two one-
dimensional indices (one for men and one for women). An immediate con-
sequence is that whenever two males, j and j′, have different vectors of
observable characteristics but the same index, their spouses must be drawn
from the same distribution; technically, there exists, for each gender, an
(unknown) function of observable characteristics that is a sufficient statistic
for the spouse’s distribution. COQ show that the index can be (ordinally)
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identified from data on matching patterns; moreover, the index assumption
can be tested non parametrically. Note that this approach can be general-
ized beyond the TU framework; it applies to NTU or ITU models, and also
to search frameworks.
5.4 Identifying Complementarities on Unobservables
Fox, Hsu and Yang (2015) suggest an approach to identification in mar-
riage markets that in some sense is the polar opposite of that of Choo and
Siow (2006): instead of restricting the distribution of errors to learn aboaut
the mean surplus, they restrict the mean surplus function and they go after
the distribution of the unobservables ε.
While Fox et al discuss several specifications, all of them rely on the
analyst observing many small markets in which the mean surplus function
is identical. Their baseline result (which is relaxed later in the paper) in
fact assumes that the mean surplus of every possible match is observed by
the analyst. Therefore the joint surplus of a match between a man i and a
woman j is
S(i, j) + εij
and the function S is known, while the ε’s are drawn from an unknown
distribution G. All markets have N men and N women, and all agents must
be matched on each market. Markets share the same distribution G, but
each has its own draw of the ε’s; and each market has a different function
S.
A simple way of representing this problem is to write the surpluses of all
possible matches in a given market as an N ×N matrix of the form (S+E).
Then the optimal matching is the bistochastic matrix21 ∆ that maximizes
the total joint surplus
N∑
i,j=1





21A bistochastic matrix has non-negative elements, and each row and each column sum
up to one.
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The data identify the distribution of ∆ conditional on S, which is driven by
the unknown distribution G of E. Fox et al show that if there are enough
markets that all possible matrices S are represented, then the distribution
G is identified.
This is a remarkable result, but it requires very strong assumptions.
Moreover, its implementation is likely to be very challenging as the number
of markets required to get a reliable estimate of a non-restricted distribution
G will probably be very large. Nevertheless, combining these ideas with
those in section 5.1 seems to be a very promising research direction.
6 Observable surplus or transfers
In all models discussed so far, we constantly assumed that the econometri-
cian can only observe matching patterns. Quite obviously, this restriction
strongly limits the scope of any empirical work. It is easy to get a first
intuition of these limitations. Forget unobservable characteristics for a mo-
ment, and assume one characteristic only matters for matching; assume
moreover that we observe a perfectly assortative matching. From this ob-
servation, we can certainly infer that the surplus function is supermodular.
But, conversely, any supermodular function would generate the same match-
ing; therefore, matching patterns tell us exactly nothing about the precise
nature of the surplus function within the (rather large) set of supermodular
mappings. While this example is highly specific, it conveys the main mes-
sage: when only matching patterns are observed, we should either limit our
expectations to very partial identification (e.g., sign-based identification),
or be willing to accept strong (and probably parametric) assumptions.
6.1 Hedonic models
The situation is much more favorable when other aspects of the matching
outcomes are observed as well. In some cases, for instance, the equilibrium
transfers are also observable. A typical example is provided by hedonic
models (which are canonically equivalent to matching models, as discussed
above). Indeed, available data generally include not only matching patterns
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(which buyer purchases which product from which seller), but also equi-
librium prices. In that case, one could expect much stronger identification
results to obtain.
The econometrics of hedonic models has until recently concentrated on a
very specific model, initially analyzed by Tinbergen (1956). For expositional
purposes, it is useful to briefly recall its main characteristics22. Buyers’
preferences and producers’ profits are quadratic:
U (x, z) = xz − a
2
z2 − P (z)
Π (y, z) = P (z)− yz − b
2
z2
where P (z) is the price of product z, a, b are parameters, and x and y are
the buyer’s and seller’s respective idiosyncratic characteristic; the latter are







, a = x, y. In that case, one can show that matching
is negative assortative:
x = αy + β, α < 0
and the equilibrium price is also quadratic in z:




where α, β, p1, p2 are parameters that can in principle be econometrically
identified. The identification problem, in that case, boils down to the fol-
lowing question: can we, from the sole observation of matching patterns
and prices (that is, α, β, p1, p2), recover the parameters of the model (two
means, two variances and the structural parameters a and b)? The answer is
clearly negative: equilibrium prices, together with matching patterns, pro-
vide four equations which cannot pin down the six unknowns.23 Moreover,
the identification process, initially suggested by Rosen (1974) and discussed
by Brown and Rosen (1982), raises difficult endogeneity problems.
22Our presentation exactly follows that of Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2002).
23In fact, one of the variances can be normalized to one, but one of the equations is
redundant, and the indetermination remains.
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Recent advances, however, have shown that the normal-quadratic ex-
ample is misleading: the non identification result that characterizes that
case is highly specific. The intuition is that, in general, we can observe
much more than the mean and (co)variances of the distributions at stake.
That a distribution can be entirely defined by these few parameters (as is
the case under normality assumptions) is a highly peculiar (‘non generic’)
case. In general, we should think of the identification problem in non para-
metric terms: both the observables and the unknowns are functions and
distributions. In a systematic analysis, Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim
(2004) actually show that, under the assumption of additive separability
of the random component, hedonic models of this kind are non parametri-
cally identified in a generic sense. The extension of these results to the non
separable case is discussed in Heckman, Matzkin and Nesheim (2010) and
Chernozhukov, Galichon and Henry (2014). Recently, Nesheim (2013) has
proposed a multidimensional extension of these results.
6.2 Observable behavior
In the (many) cases in which transfers are not observed, additional identi-
fication power can in principle be gained by observing the behavior of the
matched partners. While this approach has not yet been fully developed,
we describe here a recent contribution of Chiappori, Costa-Dias and Meghir
(2015). They consider a model in which agents first invest in education,
then enter the marriage market and match based on their human capital;
during a third stage (“productive life”), they consume, save and supply la-
bor. Gains from marriage arise from two sources: the joint consumption
of a public good and the sharing of the risk generated by random shocks
affecting wages and human capital. The authors adopt a TU framework;
therefore, once married, the couple maximizes the sum of individual util-
ities. This makes it possible to use standard, dynamic models of savings
and labor supply. The main parameters (and in particular the distribu-
tion of individual preference parameters) can therefore be estimated from
labor supply. Crucially, this implies that the value of the surplus generated
by each type of marriage can be directly recovered from observed behavior.
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The analysis of the matching stage, in turn, determines the equilibrium allo-
cation of the surplus between spouses; ultimately, this pins down the return
on investments in human capital, which can be used to estimate the first
stage.
The model is estimated using the British HPS. From a technical view-
point, a parametric version can be identified using moment estimators. Un-
like the Choo-Siow framework, however, the model is testable, because the
matching patterns must be compatible with the surplus estimations derived
from the analysis of savings and labor supply. Clearly, more work is needed
in this promising direction.
Conclusion
Although the empirical literature on frictionless matching has made spec-
tacular progress over the last decade, many questions remain open. For one
thing, the majority of existing applications consider a model of one-to-one,
bilateral matching; but there is a host of other types of matching models ripe
for empirical analysis. These include “roommate” problems, in which people
matching to form a pair belong to the same population24; many-to-one and
many-to-many matching, which bring up thorny theoretical issues25; and
more general approaches of the “matching in contracts” type (Hatfield and
Milgrom 2005), which unify TU and NTU at the theoretical level but have
yet to be taken to data in a rigorous way.
Another set of open issues are related to what could be called “pre-
matching investments”. In the analysis described above, the distributions
of agents’ characteristics were considered as exogenously given. In practice,
however, characteristics on which agents match are often the product of
some investment decision that was made before the matching game. The
(prospective) outcome of the future matching game then typically influences
the investment decisions. For instance, when choosing a level of education,
or more generally deciding on a human capital investment, agents presum-
24See Chiappori, Galichon and Salanie´ (2013) for a recent investigation.
25See Fox and Bajari 2013 and Fox 2010b.
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ably consider all returns to this investement, including those perceived on
the marriage market. After all, a higher stock of human capital may affect
a person’s marriage probability and the “quality” (say, the education or in-
come) of their potential spouses—but also the size of the surplus generated
and its allocation between spouses. This intuition is formalized by Chiap-
pori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009), who argue that features of the marriage mar-
ket can explain why investments in higher education has been remarkably
asymmetric between genders over the recent decades; Chiappori, Salanie´ and
Weiss (2013) provide an empirical investigation of this view. In the same
vein, Low (2014) argues that a shift in the nature of matching equilibria,
itself generated by structural changes in both desired fertility and returns to
human capital investments, has dramatically reduced the cost of female in-
vestement in higher education. While reduced form evidence supports these
views, structural estimates (possibly in the direction initiated by Chiappori,
Costas Dias and Meghir 2015) still need to be developed.
A last and promising avenue for future investigation is the relationship
between models based on frictionless matching and models related to search
approaches. We argued in our Introduction that given only data about
“who matches with whom”, it will be hard to distinguish the predictions
of matching models with unobserved heterogeneity and those of matching
models with frictions. To be more precise, take the pioneering Shimer–Smith
(2000) model. This is somehat different from our framework in that the two
sides of the market are treated symmetrically; but it makes our points more
transparently.
Shimer and Smith describe a market in which types i, j ∈ [0, 1] meet
randomly, consider how they can share their surplus s(i, j), and decide to
match or to wait for a better partner. The primitives are the distribution
of types µ and the joint surplus function s, along with discount rate r, rate
of random meetings ρ, and rate of destruction of matches δ. Given various
restrictions, there is a unique steady state equilibrium; this yields numbers
of singles η(i, 0) and matching patterns η(i, j). Now let the econometrician
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observe some aggregate matching patterns, say
η˜(x, 0) =
∫
1(xi = x)dµ(i) and η˜(x, y) =
∫
1(xi = x, xj = y)dη (i, j) .
The econometrician could neglect frictions and fit a Choo and Siow model
to this data, with separable unobserved heterogeneity of the type I EV form.
We know from Section 5 that this model is just identified nonparametrically;
that is, the econometrician could rationalize the data perfectly with a model
of the form








Conversely, can data generated by a model of frictionless matching with
unobserved heterogeneity also be rationalized by a model of matching with
frictions but no unobserved heterogeneity? In the Shimer–Smith model, the
answer turns out to be negative. Take a type i. When unmatched, she will
meet all other types with a probability proportional to their frequency in the
unmatched population. This applies in particular to all types that belong
to i’s “matching set” (that is, types that are acceptable to her.) Take two







With frictions, matching sets are nondegenerate; and given data that is
disaggregated enough, the equality above will impose restrictions on the
observed matching patterns. It follows that the model of Choo and Siow
can rationalize matching patterns that are inconsistent with the framework
of Shimer and Smith.
This can be seen as a positive or a negative, depending on one’s inclina-
tion. In any case, it is very specific to assumptions that Shimer and Smith
make mostly for simplicity. If for instance meetings were driven by directed
search, the relationship above would break. There are many variants of mod-
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els with frictions and it is hard to make a general statement. We conjecture,
however, that given only data about matching patterns in a cross-section, it
is impossible to distinguish between models with frictions and models with
unobserved heterogeneity. Explaining the dispersion of observed outcomes
by frictions, in that sense, is an a priori not a data-driven choice.26
26Of course, models with frictions are most often used in settings in which a time
dimension is available and/or transfers can be observed. On labor markets for instance,
wage transitions and the dynamics of employment offer rich information to identify the
model. A recent contribution by Hagedorn et al (2014) shows how all components of the
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